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Opera is always regarded as the most expensive of the performing arts. It
often absorbs the lion’s share of government subsidy to them, though it is the
least widely attended. In the UK, for example, opera received five times the
amount of subsidy per attendance compared to other Arts Council
supported performing arts organizations, though it was attended by only 7
per cent of the population (Towse, 2001). The relatively higher costs of
supply are usually held to be due to the nature of the art form, which requires
the combination of the resources of a performing company of principal
singers, chorus and full-size orchestra with those of a theatre. Often a ballet
company is joined to the opera company, sharing the theatrical and orches-
tral facilities and supplying dance services to grand opera productions.
The costs of opera can be broken down into those associated with
running the opera house, the fixed costs of maintaining the theatrical facil-
ities (sets, lighting, stage management and so on), the orchestra, chorus and
company principal singers (performers on a regular salary) and the music
staff; the fixed costs of each opera production (sets and costumes, rehear-
sal time) and the marginal costs of each performance, chief among which
are the fees to guest artists and other freelance performers, such as extra
chorus and ‘supers’ (supernumerary spear carriers, tightrope walkers and
the like). Below, more is said about the microeconomics of opera.
The underlying causes of high costs are, however, more complex and are
intimately tied to the economic history of opera, the typical repertoire per-
formed and the economic organization of performance. It is because opera
is still so closely connected to the performance traditions and conventions
of the nineteenth century that it is subject to high costs and prices and small
audiences; if there were the demand for small-scale modern opera in ‘ordi-
nary’ venues, there is no reason why it should cost considerably more than
spoken theatre. It is worth noting that it is the combination of a ‘fixed’ audi-
ence demand for a ‘high culture’ repertoire with the fixed factors of produc-
tion of performances that gives rise to Baumol’s cost disease in opera as in
the performing arts in general.
Economic history of opera
The transition of opera supply from its initial court patronage in various
Italian states to a highly developed private market which, in the eighteenth
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century, spread to London, Vienna and St Petersburg and, in the nine-
teenth, to New York and Buenos Aires, has been analysed in glorious detail
by Rosselli (1984). The ‘impresario system’ organized and financed the
whole chain of operatic production from the commissioning of the libretto
and musical composition to box rental in theatres. Most of the operas per-
formed today were first produced under this system in opera houses that
were purpose-built for them and that we continue to use. However, this
operatic repertoire was created in social and economic conditions of abun-
dant and relatively cheap orchestral musicians and chorus singers, with a
few star principals, playing to capacity audiences of between 600 and 1500.
Some of the impresarios even made it pay; nowadays, however, the combi-
nation of large labour resources needed for this repertoire and limited
seating capacity of the old opera houses conspires to make opera formid-
ably expensive, so that only very high ticket prices could cover costs.
The comparable economic history of German opera supply has not so
far been analysed in the round. Today, Germany probably supports more
opera companies than any other country among its 152 publicly owned
theatre companies (King, 2001). Besides the ‘A’ houses – Munich, Berlin
and Hamburg, for instance – where the company operates in its own house,
there are many opera companies which share the city’s theatre with spoken
drama and other uses. The typical German opera company tends to offer a
broader repertoire than would be found in opera houses in other countries,
regularly performing operetta and musicals with their ‘classically’ trained
singers.1 A major feature of German opera, which is (or was) also to be
found in some East European countries, is that all salaried company
members, including the performers, are civil servants, either of state or of
city, and enjoy the same job protection and conditions of work as other
state employees. That includes principal singers who usually have a ‘fest’
contract. By contrast, opera houses in the USA and the UK have developed
as private non-profit organizations, which are in receipt of a mixture of
subsidy, patronage and sponsorship; in these countries there is an active
market place for singers, conductors, directors and set designers working
freelance with contracts that are specific to an operatic production. The
present-day costs of opera are thus influenced by its institutional economic
history.
Organization of opera performance
An important determinant of the cost of producing opera is the system
by which performances are organized – by the ‘stagione’ or in repertory. The
stagione (meaning literally the ‘season’) is the classic Italian system whereby
one opera is given a certain number of performances (usually six to ten) over
several weeks, followed by a rehearsal period for the next opera (during
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which the theatre may also be used for ballet, orchestral performances and
chamber music), after which that opera is performed for its run, and so on.
Over the performing season from late Autumn to the end of Spring, perhaps
six or eight operas are produced sequentially. This system is still followed in
most opera houses in Italy. Under the stagione system, principal singers are
hired by the opera for the rehearsal period and the run of performances; to
ensure good quality performance, the demands made on the singing voice
by opera and the need to protect vocal health are met by having only three
or four performances of the opera per week. This is costly, because it results
in many ‘dark’ nights in the opera house and also the resident orchestra is
not used much during the rehearsal period, unless for ballet.
The repertory system of opera performance, like its spoken theatre
equivalent, has nightly alternating performances of several operas in the
repertory over the performing season or year. This system is to be found
in most German opera houses. It demands either a great deal from the
company of singers or a larger company. It facilitates more performances
(of each opera and likely of more operas), some portion being revivals from
previous performing seasons.2 Many opera houses in fact operate a mixed
system of stagione and repertory, meaning that an opera enters the reper-
toire for a season and is performed alternately with several others over
a period of time. This clearly calls for much more careful planning of
resource use as well as greater use of guest artists to supplement company
principal singers and possibly also a much larger chorus.3
There is one other type of performance organization – the opera festival;
examples are the Bayreuth Festspiele, Glyndebourne Festival Opera (a
private company in the UK), the Arena di Verona, the Rossini Festival in
Pesaro, Santa Fe and Wexford. Festivals run for a short period of the year,
often the summer, and may make use of performers from the regular houses
during the summer break (Frey and Vautravers, 2000).
Repertoire
Though thousands of operas have been written, many of which are even
in performing editions, only a very small fraction of them is performed
at all and of those there is a canon of the most commonly performed operas
that are the mainstay of opera houses. La Bohème, Madama Butterfly, La
Traviata, Carmen, Il Barbiere di Siviglia and Le Nozze di Figaro are regu-
larly to be found in the performance schedule of every opera house from
Stockholm to Sydney. These are the operas that are popular with audiences
worldwide and are reliable income-earners. Audiences fall dramatically for
modern opera, even at reduced ticket prices, which could not be performed
without extra subsidy. The role of subsidy in encouraging the production
of a wider and more risky repertoire has been analysed for the USA by
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Pierce (2000); however, Heilbrun (2001) found that the repertoire of US
opera houses was shrinking. Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) look at this
question in the wider context of the incentive structure of German opera
houses and argue that managers there can afford to ignore audience tastes
and instead put on productions that enhance their professional reputation
in their peer group, including the less popular repertoire. We return to this
important study below in the context of the management of opera houses.
Besides its influence on demand and revenues, the choice of performed
repertoire also has implications for costs. Some operas are more expensive
to put on than others because they demand more star singers (Verdi’s Aida
is an example of an opera that can rarely be made to pay in a conventional
opera house because of its casting requirements) and/or more principals,
larger chorus, complex sets or lighting, a large orchestra, unusual instru-
mentation or effects, and suchlike. The opera management has some free-
dom to decide on the quality of performers it wishes to hire (and more
freedom with the stagione system) but certain roles are difficult to cast with
‘ordinary’ company principals: for example, Brunnhilde, Boris Godunov,
Salome and Siegfried. These roles invite star performance, and uneven
casting shows up all too easily. With smaller roles there is some scope for
hiring young singers or casting members of the chorus (for heralds and the
like – ‘Mach Platz’!) allowing cost savings but, by and large, the decision
of repertoire dictates ‘fixed factors’ of singers (Towse, 1993). Because the
demand for singers is a derived demand, the frequency of the performed
repertoire determines the demand for principal singers; freelance principal
singers, who have to finance their own learning of the repertoire (company
singers/chorus are coached by house répétiteurs) tend to supply roles from
the standard performed operas, making it more difficult and expensive to
hire singers for roles outside the standard repertoire. Also some voice types
are in shorter supply than others (for example, Heldentenors) and conse-
quently receive higher fees.
Pricing policy
All theatres, including opera houses, practise price discrimination accord-
ing to part of the house, night of the week and so on. In opera, this is taken
somewhat further, with prices being raised for a star singer or for some
operas (for example, Der Ring des Nibelungens) or reduced to attract audi-
ences to modern opera (Blaug, 1997). A difference arises here between
those countries in which the subscription system of payment prevails and
those where it does not (for example, the UK). When patrons subscribe for
a whole season, a mix of repertoire is charged for in the package and this
can ‘cross-subsidize’ less popular repertoires with popular operas. Nothing
to my knowledge has been written on the economics of these two systems.
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Opera management
All the points raised above are the subject of management decisions in each
opera house. Different approaches have been taken to this topic: a purely
management approach which considers the management structure and its
ability to cope with decision making (Auvinen, 2000), a microeconomic
approach, looking at the opera house as a firm (Blaug, 1997), and a politi-
cal economy approach that analyses incentives and agency problems relat-
ing to the state subsidy of opera (Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Towse,
2001).
Using case studies of national opera companies in several countries,
Auvinen (2000) shows that management structures differ markedly, though
all have to make the same decisions and, with an international market for
opera, managers face the same set of prices. Blaug’s study of the Royal
Opera House Covent Garden (ROH) for the financial year 1974/75 made
this point very strongly, that to be an ‘international’ opera means paying
international prices to international stars (without whom, however, there
would be little difference between a ‘national’ opera and an international
opera company). He concluded that the biggest cost savings could be made
by reducing the number of international stars hired (including conductors
and producers with singers) or, to put it another way, that to maintain the
same ‘quality’, costs would inevitably rise and, unless subsidy were in-
creased, prices would have to rise proportionately.4
By the time of a study of the market for singers and the outlay by opera
companies in the UK on them (Towse, 1993), the proportion of the budget
spent on singers had fallen. There are two explanations for this; first, during
the 1970s, the rate of increase in performers’ earnings had fallen well
behind those in the economy at large, as the report on inflation in the per-
formed arts in the UK (including data on the ROH) by Peacock et al. (1997)
showed; second, the cost of managerial salaries and of items such as the
materials for scenery that had risen with inflation increased, thus reducing
the proportion of the budget on artistic personnel. Be that as it may, the
fact remains that opera costs more than other performed arts, whatever
choices managers make, and receives considerable subsidy. It is therefore
inevitably controversial and has not always easily justified its higher than
average grant allocations for its higher than average income audiences.
Indeed, it has not always been called upon to do so very effectively or even
determinedly (Towse, 2001).
Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) have argued that, in Germany, opera
managers have little incentive to manage their budgets carefully because, as
with all publicly controlled bodies, revenues in excess of costs are not
retained by the opera house, and they have every incentive to squeeze as
much out of the state or city administration as possible for ‘their’ company.
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That has also been the case in Italy; now, however, opera houses are being
‘privatized’, meaning turned into non-profit organizations in receipt of
subsidy, the typical model in the USA and the UK, instead of being state-
owned and managed.
There is still much for cultural economists to study here that combines
microeconomics, public choice theory and management. One topic is the
debundling of the performing companies, opera and ballet, from the man-
agement of the opera house. Het Musiektheater in Amsterdam is an
example of this; the opera company has to contract with the theatre for its
performing slots and revenues. A further question could be whether to
retain a resident ballet company and/or orchestra – an operatic ‘make or
buy’ decision. Such possibilities call for comparative institutional studies.
Notes
1. In 1998/9, there were 6961 performances of opera, 1854 of operetta and 3296 of musicals
(and 2692 of ballet) (King, 2001).
2. Singers are protected by their conditions of work, which in Germany even stipulate what
roles a singer may be required to sing in his or her ‘Fach’; however, as many principal
singers are on long-term contract, the management has the right to direct their services
as it sees fit. On some occasions when ‘substitute’ operas are to be performed, principal
singers may only find out a few days beforehand that they are expected to sing a major
role in their repertory.
3. Opera houses in the UK work on a mixed system; the English National Opera, which per-
forms six opera nights a week from September to June, giving around 200 performances
(about twice as many as a major German opera house and four times as many as a pro-
vincial Italian one) requires two full-time choruses to supply this performance schedule.
4. The inverted commas are intended as a sarcastic comment; at the time, the ROH inter-
preted quality as meaning international, and that meant foreign singers, even though
some, such as Joan Sutherland, were trying to make a career in Britain. See Lebrecht
(2000).
See also:
Chapter 10: Ballet; Chapter 11: Baumol’s cost disease; Chapter 46: Participation.
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